In search of the causeBy Barry Rubin http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/12/12/Columns/Columns.17230.html (December 12) What is the fighting all about? Every day we are deluged with the details of fighting, killing, plans for peace or military victory and assessments of blame. Yet there is total disagreement as to why there is a war. And without knowing why this is happening, it is impossible to find any solution. Let's discuss all the various explanations with an evaluation of each one. It quickly becomes apparent that Israeli and Palestinian interpretations are quite different, as are those held by people of different political viewpoints. Unfortunately, the problem is that there is some truth in more than one answer as to why the peace process broke down. Let's begin with three explanations held by Israelis: 1. The Palestinians want to destroy Israel and have basically never wavered from this goal. This view is one held by much of the Israeli Right. There is certainly some truth to this conception in that Islamist radicals seek this outcome, and it is certainly present in the minds of many Palestinians. But Yasser Arafat did not negotiate for seven years as a trick, nor do Palestinians seem to be going about the above-stated effort in any sensible way. 2. The breakdown is the result of a misunderstanding. Israel needed and needs to do more to meet Palestinian demands, or at least to make its intentions clear. This view is one held by much of the Israeli Left. There are two problems here. On one hand there are real differences between the Israeli maximum offer and minimum Palestinian demands. The Palestinian minimum turned out to be more than Israel's leaders expected. On the other hand, Palestinian misperceptions of Israel seem impervious to Israeli explanations. After all, today Palestinians view Prime Minister Ehud Barak as a hard-line warmonger. 3. The Palestinian side turned out to have unreasonably high demands while being too unreliable a partner. This view seems to be the consensus conclusion developing, drawing support from both the center and many on the Left or Right. The result of the peace process was not predetermined, but the Palestinians simply wanted too much while demonstrating too little credibility. The resort to violence proves this conclusion. Thus, while willing to accept an independent Palestinian state and major Israeli concessions in principle, most Israelis feel that too much is being demanded and too little given. CONTINUING the numbering, let's examine the three main Palestinian explanations. 4. There are certainly some, notably supporters of the Islamist group Hamas, who welcome the new violence as part of a campaign to eliminate Israel altogether. In one specific respect - the demand for an unrestricted right of Palestinian refugees to "return" to Israel - this could be said to have broader support. But this is not the direct goal or consensus view of most Palestinians, who view this as a defensive war. 5. Israel has no intention of making real peace and therefore armed struggle is the only way to obtain Palestinian independence and end the occupation. This is a consensus view. In part, this conception is a result of how a fair peace is defined: Palestinians getting all the West Bank, Gaza, and east Jerusalem, plus a "right of return." This is partly based on a gigantic misreading of Israeli policies and proposals. Unless Palestinian leaders open their ears and inform their public otherwise there is no way that Israel can correct these misperceptions. 6. Palestinian suffering from the occupation and the lack of improvement in their status over seven years fuels anger and justifies an uprising. This, too, is part of a consensus view. Of course it can be argued that the current violence only worsens their conditions, but those believing there is no other alternative quickly brush this objection aside. Finally, two other arguments must be added to complete the picture of explanations. 7. Details caused the breakdown. This explanation, favored among Western policymakers, has some merit, though it's impossible to measure its importance in the breakdown. Rather than viewing the problem as arising from goals this view suggests that small problems mounted up. The explosion might have been avoided if President Bill Clinton had not insisted on the Camp David summit so soon, if Barak had made small changes in his plan, if Ariel Sharon had not visited the Temple Mount, or if other things had happened differently. The implication here is that it is easier to rebuild the peace process than it seems. The problem is that even if it accurately explains the recent past, it does not erase the effect of the violence in recent months. 8. Arafat's choice. This explanation views the breakdown as largely due to Arafat's decision to turn to violence. Whatever the weight of evidence for Palestinian discontent, leadership toward war or peace was necessary. If Arafat had acted differently - either before violence broke out or in keeping his promise to press for a truce - the diplomatic process would still be continuing. This is a point whose importance I'd like to stress without neglecting the other factors. Essentially much of the Arab world supports arguments 5 and 6. In the West, these two claims battle Israel's explanation 3 to shape public opinion and governmental policies. There is genuine puzzlement about why Arafat so rejected a good-faith Israeli compromise offer as to go to war. In general the Western response is to be over-optimistic in finding some new formula to obtain peace, often seeing the generating of a few more Israeli concessions or gestures as the way to do so. There should be no doubt, however, that such measures would not come close to bridging the gap. At any rate, the bottom line is that Israel would prefer to sustain this conflict - even though it prefers peace - rather than give in to the full Palestinian demands. Consequently, unless or until Arafat changes his policy, either as a result of believing he is losing or just a flip of his whimsy, the battle will continue. |
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